俄羅斯可能把中國推向西方(Geoff Dyer)

俄羅斯可能把中國推向西方

作者：英國《金融時報》傑夫•代爾(Geoff Dyer)
2008-09-02


一些人將8月8日視為現代歷史的一個轉捩點。自二戰結束以來，威權主義在這一天首次作為一支可信的力量站了起來。電視製作人不知道該往哪里看。在一個螢幕上，中國鼓手正敲開北京奧運會開幕式的高科技表演；在另一個螢幕上，俄羅斯坦克正浩浩蕩蕩進入格魯吉亞領土。

這兩個事件似乎都是對自由民主腳步不可阻擋一說的嘲諷：俄羅斯揮舞著重新發現的軍事力量，中國則慶祝著活力和政治控制的混合。然而，與許多大敍述一樣，關於新威權政權崛起的故事遺漏了許多重要細節。俄羅斯用了過去10年的時間變得更為威權，而中國正緩慢地向相反方向發展——儘管在奧運前夕，它突然向後踉蹌了一下。

此外，這個故事還遺漏了一點，即：一個威權政權的行為如何能影響另一個威權政權的態度。俄羅斯出兵格魯吉亞就是一個明顯的例子。在俄格衝突開始之際，中國可能並非很不高興。但隨著俄羅斯承認南奧塞梯和阿布哈茲，中國的態度可能會發生轉變。如果俄羅斯進一步加大壓力，實際上，它可能會令中國更靠近美國。

中國對此次衝突並未作出什麼評論，但發生在格魯吉亞的此次小規模衝突讓俄羅斯和美國對立起來，有利於中國的短期利益。中國一直是“反恐戰爭”的間接受益者 —— 喬治•布希(George W. Bush) 8年前開始執政時，曾承諾將對中國採取更為強硬的態度，但2001年9月11日恐怖襲擊後，他的注意力就轉向了別處。然而，中國政府意識到，美國對伊斯蘭極端主義的關注可能很快減弱。隨著美國經濟下滑和中國成為全球最大的二氧化碳排放國，中國外交人士擔心，美國不同的組織將聯合起來抨擊中國。因此，如果俄羅斯重新成為美國的眼中釘，這將對中國十分有利。

中國領導人也不會因為格魯吉亞總統米哈伊爾•薩卡什維利(Mikheil Saakashvili)而無法入睡。本世紀以來，東歐和中亞所謂的“顏色革命”曾令中國統治者嚴重不安，中國曾對在中國工作的非政府組織進行打擊，因為中國擔心這些組織可能會鼓動政治改革。薩卡什維利接受過西方教育，是在一場顏色革命中上臺的，華盛頓新保守主義者稱讚他是為爭取民主而戰的鬥士。如果他被推翻，中國政府將不會為他的離去而憂傷。

中國可能還會得到其他的戰略好處。長期以來，歐洲一直希望與土庫曼斯坦和哈薩克斯坦簽訂更多油氣協定，中國在這兩個國家也有大筆投資。如果高加索地區的不穩定局勢嚇退歐洲投資者，這可能會給中國創造更多空間。如果歐美發現自己正就如何應對新的俄羅斯威脅而展開爭論，這也不會傷害到中國。

然而，所有這些考慮都基於這場小規模衝突不會升級的假設。如果俄羅斯更為攻擊性地推行其主張，那麼中國的算盤將開始發生變化。

中國經濟成功的動力越來越多來自於油氣的巨額進口，而進口規模只會變得越來越大。因此，中國不希望看到俄羅斯的攻擊性會威脅這一重要的能源供應地。實際上，中國推動創辦上海合作組織(Shanghai Co-operation Organisation)的原因之一就是，要找到一條平衡俄羅斯在中亞影響力的途徑。上海合作組織是一個區域性安全組織，其年度峰會在8月28日召開。

目前，中國政府可以保持低調，如果格魯吉亞這兩個地區的獨立問題被納入聯合國安理會(UN Security Council)討論議程，美國將投票否決，中國對此心中有數。但中國最不願看到的是衝突升級，更別提新冷戰了——這將迫使中國表明立場。

上世紀60年代初，一些西方分析人士沒有預料到中蘇衝突，因為他們把對馬列主義的共同信仰與堅定的合作夥伴聯盟這兩件事混為一談。僅僅因為這兩個國家如今正尋求發展某種形式的威權資本主義，並不意味著它們自動結成了夥伴。最近幾年，中國與俄羅斯關係較為密切，但這種同盟具有明顯的局限性，美國可以對此加以利用。

本文作者是英國《金融時報》駐京首席記者

譯者/梁豔裳


英文原稿：

RUSSIA COULD PUSH CHINA CLOSER TO THE WEST

Geoff Dyer 2008-09-02


August 8 has already been pencilled in by some as a turning point in modern history, the day that authoritarianism stood up as a credible force for the first time since the end of the cold war. Television producers did not know where to look. On one screen Chinese drummers were launching the hi-tech opening extravaganza of the Olympics, while on another Russian tanks were filing into Georgian territory.

Each event seemed to be a snub to the idea of the inevitable advance of liberal democracy – Russia with its re-discovered military muscle and China celebrating its mixture of dynamism and political control. Like so many big narratives, however, the story about the rise of the new authoritarians leaves out a lot of important detail. While Russia has spent the past decade becoming more authoritarian, China has been slowly moving in the opposite direction – even if it took a lurch backwards in the run-up to the Olympics.

The story also misses how the actions of one authoritarian regime might affect the attitudes of the other, which is very much the case with Russia's incursion into Georgia. At the start of the conflict, China was probably not too unhappy. But with Russia's recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, the attitude is likely to shift. If Russia ramps up the pressure much further, it could actually push China closer to the US.

China has said little about the conflict, but a low-level confrontation in Georgia that pits Russia against the US helps China's short-term interests rather well. China has been a backhand beneficiary of the “War on Terror” – George W. Bush entered office nearly eight years ago promising to be much tougher on China, but since the attacks of September 11 2001, his attention has been elsewhere. Yet Beijing realises that the focus on Islamic extremism could soon wane. With the US economy slumping and China becoming the world's biggest emitter of carbon dioxide, Chinese diplomats are worried that different groups in the US will join forces to slam China. So if Russia returns to being the US's pin-up villain, that suits Beijing just fine.

Chinese leaders will not be losing any sleep about Mikheil Saakashvili, the Georgian president, either. Beijing's autocrats were deeply disturbed by the so-called “colour revolutions” in eastern Europe and central Asia this decade and launched a clampdown on non-governmental organisations working in China, fearing they could be agitating for political reform. Mr Saakashvili is the western-educated product of a colour revolution who is lauded by Washington neo-conservatives as a warrior in the battle for democracy. If he is toppled, Beijing will not mourn his departure.

There could be other strategic gains, too. Europe has long been eyeing more oil and gas deals with Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan, where China also has significant investments. If instability in the Caucasus scares off European investors, that could create more space for the Chinese. It also does not hurt China if Europe and the US find themselves bickering over how to address the new Russian threat.

But all these considerations are based on the assumption of a low-level stand-off that does not escalate. If Russia pursues its claims more aggressively, the calculations in Beijing will start to change.

China's economic success is increasingly fuelled by huge imports of oil and gas that are only going to get larger. Beijing, therefore, does not want to see Russian aggression browbeat a region that is an important energy provider. Indeed, one reason China pushed for the creation of the Shanghai Co-operation Organisation – a regional security body that holds its annual meeting today – was to find a way to balance Russian influence in central Asia.

At the moment, Beijing can afford to keep a low profile, safe in the knowledge that the US will veto recognition of the two regions if it ever comes to the UN Security Council. But the last thing China wants is an escalated conflict, let alone a new cold war, that forces it to take sides.

In the early 1960s, a swathe of western analysts missed the Sino-Soviet split because they confused a shared belief in Marxism-Leninism for a lock-step partnership. Just because the two countries are now pursuing forms of authoritarian capitalism does not mean they are automatic bedfellows. China has moved closer to Russia in recent years, but there are clear limits to the alliance that Washington could exploit.

The writer is the FT's Beijing bureau chief