格魯吉亞：西方的戰略失誤(Kishore Mahbubani)

格魯吉亞：西方的戰略失誤

作者：馬凱碩(Kishore Mahbubani)為英國《金融時報》撰稿
2008-08-25


有時，小事件能預示著大變革。格魯吉亞的慘敗也許便是這樣一個小事件。它預示著後冷戰時代的結束，但並不標誌任何新冷戰的回歸。它標誌著更大的回歸：歷史的回歸。

後冷戰時代的序幕是由西方勝利拉開的，法蘭西斯•福山(Francis Fukuyama)的著作《歷史的終結》(The End of History)最早提出了這一理論。其書名相當大膽，但抓住了西方的時代精神。歷史以西方文明的勝利進行了終結。世界其他地區毫無選擇，只能屈從於西方世界的前進步伐。

在格魯吉亞，俄羅斯高聲宣佈，將不再屈從於西方。蒙羞20年後，俄羅斯已決定突然重返這裏。不久以後，其他勢力將同樣這樣做。由於其壓倒性的勢力，西方已侵入其他蟄伏國家的地緣政治空間。這些國家將不再蟄伏，尤其是亞洲國家。

實際上，世界上大部分地區都為西方在格魯吉亞問題上的說教感到困惑。美國不會容忍俄羅斯侵入其在拉美的地緣政治空間。因此，拉美國家清楚地看到了美國的雙重標準。所有提及美國非法入侵伊拉克的穆斯林評論也一樣。印度與中國都沒有向俄羅斯提出抗議。這表明，西方世界在格魯吉亞問題上的觀點是何等孤立：它們認為，全世界都應該支持受迫害的格魯吉亞反對俄羅斯。事實上，大多數國家都支持俄羅斯，反對恃強欺弱的西方。西方世界與世界其他地區之間的隔閡已擴大至極致。

因此，西方世界從格魯吉亞事件中汲取正確的教訓非常重要。它需要從戰略上考慮其有限的選擇。自蘇聯解體後，西方思想家想當然地認為，西方再也不需要進行地緣政治妥協了。它可以開列條件。但現在必須承認現實。北美、歐盟和澳大拉西亞等西方人口總和為7億，占全世界人口的10%左右。其餘90%正從世界歷史的被動者轉變成主動者。2008年8月18日英國《金融時報》上的大字標題“西方在格魯吉亞問題上形成統一戰線”(West in united front over Georgia)應該寫成：“世界其他地區在格魯吉亞對西方挑錯”。原因為何？是因為西方缺乏戰略思維。

縱然有缺點，毛澤東仍為一位偉大的戰略思想家。他曾說過，中國永遠要解決主要矛盾，協調次要矛盾。當蘇聯成為主要矛盾時，毛澤東與美國和解，即使這意味著要蒙受恥辱——與一個當時承認蔣介石為合法統治者的大國打交道。西方必須效仿毛澤東的實用主義，集中力量解決主要矛盾。

俄羅斯遠不是西方面臨的主要矛盾。真正戰略上的選擇在於其主要挑戰是來自伊斯蘭世界還有中國。自2001年9月11日以來，西方表現得好像伊斯蘭世界是其主要挑戰。然而，西方毫無策略地跳入伊斯蘭世界，而不是制定一個長期戰略來贏取12億穆斯林。因此，在阿富汗與伊朗，失敗已隱隱顯現，而整個伊斯蘭世界形成了一個更為敵視的環境。

很多歐洲思想家敏銳地意識到許多美國政策的愚蠢。但他們不願面對把安全保障工作外包給美國武裝力量的危險。在安全方面，地理要高於文化。由於地理原因，歐洲不得不擔心伊斯蘭的憤怒。而由於橫隔大西洋，美國這樣做的動機不大。

在美國，新保守派的領軍人物視中國為他們的主要矛盾。然而，他們也熱心於支持以色列，卻沒有意識到，這一立場對中國是一份地緣政治上的禮物。它保證了美國要面對整個敵對的伊斯蘭世界，使其注意力從中國身上轉離。毫無疑問，中國是9/11事件的更大贏家。當美國注意力被轉移時，中國已穩定了周邊地區。

西方面臨的最大悖論是：現在終於有可能創建一個更安全的世界秩序。想成為“負責任的利益攸關者”(responsible stakeholders)的國家數量之多前所未有。包括中印在內的多數國家都想與美國和西方合作。但建立一個穩定的世界秩序的最大障礙在於，西方缺乏對整個世界的長期連貫的戰略，並未能作出地緣政治讓步。西方國家領導人稱，世界正變得越來越危險，但很少有人承認，這是由於他們的思維方式有問題。格魯吉亞事件揭示了缺乏戰略性思維的後果。

作者是新加坡國立大學李光耀公共政策學院院長，新著《亞半球大國崛起──亞洲強權再起的衝擊與挑戰》(The New Asian Hemisphere: the Irresistible Shift of Global Power to the East)

譯者/陳雲飛


The west is strategically wrong on Georgia

By Kishore Mahbubani
2008-08-25


Sometimes small events can portend great changes. The Georgian fiasco may be one such event. It heralds the end of the post cold-war era. But it does not mark the return of any new cold war. It marks an even bigger return: the return of history.

The post-cold-war era began on a note of western triumphalism, symbolised by Francis Fukuyama's book The End of History. The title was audacious but it captured the western zeitgeist. History had ended with the triumph of western civilisation. The rest of the world had no choice but to capitulate to the advance of the west.

In Georgia, Russia has loudly declared that it will no longer capitulate to the west. After two decades of humiliation Russia has decided to snap back. Before long, other forces will do the same. As a result of its overwhelming power, the west has intruded into the geopolitical spaces of other dormant countries. They are no longer dormant, especially in Asia.

Indeed, most of the world is bemused by western moralising on Georgia. America would not tolerate Russia intruding into its geopolitical sphere in Latin America. Hence Latin Americans see American double standards clearly. So do all the Muslim commentaries that note that the US invaded Iraq illegally, too. Neither India nor China is moved to protest against Russia. It shows how isolated is the western view on Georgia: that the world should support the underdog, Georgia, against Russia. In reality, most support Russia against the bullying west. The gap between the western narrative and the rest of the world could not be greater.

It is therefore critical for the west to learn the right lessons from Georgia. It needs to think strategically about the limited options it has. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, western thinkers assumed the west would never need to make geopolitical compromises. It could dictate terms. Now it must recognise reality. The combined western population in North America, the European Union and Australasia is 700m, about 10 per cent of the world's population. The remaining 90 per cent have gone from being objects of world history to subjects. The Financial Times headline of August 18 2008 proclaimed: “West in united front over Georgia”. It should have read: “Rest of the world faults west on Georgia”. Why? A lack of strategic thinking.

Mao Zedong, for all his flaws, was a great strategic thinker. He said China always had to deal with its primary contradiction and compromise with its secondary contradiction. When the Soviet Union became the primary contradiction, Mao settled with the US, even though it involved the humiliation of dealing with a power that then recognised Chiang Kai-shek as the legitimate ruler. The west must emulate Mao's pragmatism and focus on its primary contradiction.

Russia is not even close to becoming the primary contradiction the west faces. The real strategic choice is whether its primary challenge comes from the Islamic world or China. Since September 11 2001, the west has acted as though the Islamic world is the primary challenge. Yet rather than devise a long-term strategy to win over 1.2bn Muslims, the west has jumped into the Islamic world with no strategy. Hence there are looming failures in Afghanistan and Iraq and an even more hostile environment in the Islamic world.

Many European thinkers are acutely aware of the folly of many US policies. But they are reluctant to confront the dangers of outsourcing their security to US power. In security, geography trumps culture. Because of geography, Europe has to worry about Islamic anger. Because of the Atlantic Ocean, the US has less reason to do so.

In the US, leading neo-conservative thinkers see China as their primary contradiction. Yet they also support Israel with a passion, without realising this stance is a geopolitical gift to China. It guarantees the US faces a hostile Islamic universe, distracting it from focusing on China. There is no doubt China was the bigger winner of 9/11. It has stabilised its neighbourhood, while the US has been distracted.

The biggest paradox facing the west is that it is at last possible to create a safer world order. The number of countries wanting to become “responsible stakeholders” has never been higher. Most, including China and India, want to work with the US and the west. But the absence of a long-term coherent western strategy towards the world and the inability to make geopolitical compromises are the biggest obstacles to a stable world order. Western leaders say the world is becoming a more dangerous place, yet few admit that their flawed thinking is bringing this about. Georgia illustrates the results of a lack of strategic thinking.

The writer, dean of the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy (National University of Singapore), has just published The New Asian Hemisphere: the Irresistible Shift of Global Power to the East

俄羅斯可能把中國推向西方(Geoff Dyer)

俄羅斯可能把中國推向西方

作者：英國《金融時報》傑夫•代爾(Geoff Dyer)
2008-09-02


一些人將8月8日視為現代歷史的一個轉捩點。自二戰結束以來，威權主義在這一天首次作為一支可信的力量站了起來。電視製作人不知道該往哪里看。在一個螢幕上，中國鼓手正敲開北京奧運會開幕式的高科技表演；在另一個螢幕上，俄羅斯坦克正浩浩蕩蕩進入格魯吉亞領土。

這兩個事件似乎都是對自由民主腳步不可阻擋一說的嘲諷：俄羅斯揮舞著重新發現的軍事力量，中國則慶祝著活力和政治控制的混合。然而，與許多大敍述一樣，關於新威權政權崛起的故事遺漏了許多重要細節。俄羅斯用了過去10年的時間變得更為威權，而中國正緩慢地向相反方向發展——儘管在奧運前夕，它突然向後踉蹌了一下。

此外，這個故事還遺漏了一點，即：一個威權政權的行為如何能影響另一個威權政權的態度。俄羅斯出兵格魯吉亞就是一個明顯的例子。在俄格衝突開始之際，中國可能並非很不高興。但隨著俄羅斯承認南奧塞梯和阿布哈茲，中國的態度可能會發生轉變。如果俄羅斯進一步加大壓力，實際上，它可能會令中國更靠近美國。

中國對此次衝突並未作出什麼評論，但發生在格魯吉亞的此次小規模衝突讓俄羅斯和美國對立起來，有利於中國的短期利益。中國一直是“反恐戰爭”的間接受益者 —— 喬治•布希(George W. Bush) 8年前開始執政時，曾承諾將對中國採取更為強硬的態度，但2001年9月11日恐怖襲擊後，他的注意力就轉向了別處。然而，中國政府意識到，美國對伊斯蘭極端主義的關注可能很快減弱。隨著美國經濟下滑和中國成為全球最大的二氧化碳排放國，中國外交人士擔心，美國不同的組織將聯合起來抨擊中國。因此，如果俄羅斯重新成為美國的眼中釘，這將對中國十分有利。

中國領導人也不會因為格魯吉亞總統米哈伊爾•薩卡什維利(Mikheil Saakashvili)而無法入睡。本世紀以來，東歐和中亞所謂的“顏色革命”曾令中國統治者嚴重不安，中國曾對在中國工作的非政府組織進行打擊，因為中國擔心這些組織可能會鼓動政治改革。薩卡什維利接受過西方教育，是在一場顏色革命中上臺的，華盛頓新保守主義者稱讚他是為爭取民主而戰的鬥士。如果他被推翻，中國政府將不會為他的離去而憂傷。

中國可能還會得到其他的戰略好處。長期以來，歐洲一直希望與土庫曼斯坦和哈薩克斯坦簽訂更多油氣協定，中國在這兩個國家也有大筆投資。如果高加索地區的不穩定局勢嚇退歐洲投資者，這可能會給中國創造更多空間。如果歐美發現自己正就如何應對新的俄羅斯威脅而展開爭論，這也不會傷害到中國。

然而，所有這些考慮都基於這場小規模衝突不會升級的假設。如果俄羅斯更為攻擊性地推行其主張，那麼中國的算盤將開始發生變化。

中國經濟成功的動力越來越多來自於油氣的巨額進口，而進口規模只會變得越來越大。因此，中國不希望看到俄羅斯的攻擊性會威脅這一重要的能源供應地。實際上，中國推動創辦上海合作組織(Shanghai Co-operation Organisation)的原因之一就是，要找到一條平衡俄羅斯在中亞影響力的途徑。上海合作組織是一個區域性安全組織，其年度峰會在8月28日召開。

目前，中國政府可以保持低調，如果格魯吉亞這兩個地區的獨立問題被納入聯合國安理會(UN Security Council)討論議程，美國將投票否決，中國對此心中有數。但中國最不願看到的是衝突升級，更別提新冷戰了——這將迫使中國表明立場。

上世紀60年代初，一些西方分析人士沒有預料到中蘇衝突，因為他們把對馬列主義的共同信仰與堅定的合作夥伴聯盟這兩件事混為一談。僅僅因為這兩個國家如今正尋求發展某種形式的威權資本主義，並不意味著它們自動結成了夥伴。最近幾年，中國與俄羅斯關係較為密切，但這種同盟具有明顯的局限性，美國可以對此加以利用。

本文作者是英國《金融時報》駐京首席記者

譯者/梁豔裳


英文原稿：

RUSSIA COULD PUSH CHINA CLOSER TO THE WEST

Geoff Dyer 2008-09-02


August 8 has already been pencilled in by some as a turning point in modern history, the day that authoritarianism stood up as a credible force for the first time since the end of the cold war. Television producers did not know where to look. On one screen Chinese drummers were launching the hi-tech opening extravaganza of the Olympics, while on another Russian tanks were filing into Georgian territory.

Each event seemed to be a snub to the idea of the inevitable advance of liberal democracy – Russia with its re-discovered military muscle and China celebrating its mixture of dynamism and political control. Like so many big narratives, however, the story about the rise of the new authoritarians leaves out a lot of important detail. While Russia has spent the past decade becoming more authoritarian, China has been slowly moving in the opposite direction – even if it took a lurch backwards in the run-up to the Olympics.

The story also misses how the actions of one authoritarian regime might affect the attitudes of the other, which is very much the case with Russia's incursion into Georgia. At the start of the conflict, China was probably not too unhappy. But with Russia's recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, the attitude is likely to shift. If Russia ramps up the pressure much further, it could actually push China closer to the US.

China has said little about the conflict, but a low-level confrontation in Georgia that pits Russia against the US helps China's short-term interests rather well. China has been a backhand beneficiary of the “War on Terror” – George W. Bush entered office nearly eight years ago promising to be much tougher on China, but since the attacks of September 11 2001, his attention has been elsewhere. Yet Beijing realises that the focus on Islamic extremism could soon wane. With the US economy slumping and China becoming the world's biggest emitter of carbon dioxide, Chinese diplomats are worried that different groups in the US will join forces to slam China. So if Russia returns to being the US's pin-up villain, that suits Beijing just fine.

Chinese leaders will not be losing any sleep about Mikheil Saakashvili, the Georgian president, either. Beijing's autocrats were deeply disturbed by the so-called “colour revolutions” in eastern Europe and central Asia this decade and launched a clampdown on non-governmental organisations working in China, fearing they could be agitating for political reform. Mr Saakashvili is the western-educated product of a colour revolution who is lauded by Washington neo-conservatives as a warrior in the battle for democracy. If he is toppled, Beijing will not mourn his departure.

There could be other strategic gains, too. Europe has long been eyeing more oil and gas deals with Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan, where China also has significant investments. If instability in the Caucasus scares off European investors, that could create more space for the Chinese. It also does not hurt China if Europe and the US find themselves bickering over how to address the new Russian threat.

But all these considerations are based on the assumption of a low-level stand-off that does not escalate. If Russia pursues its claims more aggressively, the calculations in Beijing will start to change.

China's economic success is increasingly fuelled by huge imports of oil and gas that are only going to get larger. Beijing, therefore, does not want to see Russian aggression browbeat a region that is an important energy provider. Indeed, one reason China pushed for the creation of the Shanghai Co-operation Organisation – a regional security body that holds its annual meeting today – was to find a way to balance Russian influence in central Asia.

At the moment, Beijing can afford to keep a low profile, safe in the knowledge that the US will veto recognition of the two regions if it ever comes to the UN Security Council. But the last thing China wants is an escalated conflict, let alone a new cold war, that forces it to take sides.

In the early 1960s, a swathe of western analysts missed the Sino-Soviet split because they confused a shared belief in Marxism-Leninism for a lock-step partnership. Just because the two countries are now pursuing forms of authoritarian capitalism does not mean they are automatic bedfellows. China has moved closer to Russia in recent years, but there are clear limits to the alliance that Washington could exploit.

The writer is the FT's Beijing bureau chief