Vincent Reinhart：越俎代庖的美聯儲聯邦儲備委員會(Fed)前任貨幣政策主管週一在華盛頓的一個論壇上表示，Fed援救貝爾斯登公司(Bear Stearns Cos.)的行動將來會被視為幾十年中最嚴重的政策失誤。
去年秋天從Fed退休、現為美國企業研究院(American Enterprise Institute)學者的文森特·萊因哈特(Vincent Reinhart)說，Fed的這一舉措堪比20世紀30年代的“大蕭條”和70年代的“大通脹”。美國企業研究院是傾向於保守的華盛頓智囊團。
萊因哈特是在美國企業研究院週一的一個小組討論中說出上面那番話的，這是Fed在貝爾斯登事件中的舉措遭到的最為刺耳的批評之一。今年3月，Fed先是為貝爾斯登提供貸款作為臨時融資，後又為貝爾斯登的資產提供了290億美元的擔保，以便摩根大通公司(JPMorgan Chase & Co.)順利收購這家投資銀行。
萊因哈特說，這一救援行動令Fed永遠失去了充當誠信中間人的可能性。
萊因哈特說，如果Fed試圖重演其在1998年組織金融界債權人解救對沖基金Long Term Capital Management的行動，“在場諸位都會問一個合理的問題：你能為解決問題貢獻多大的力量？”
萊因哈特說，如果為避免許多其他投行產生連鎖反應而只能選擇Fed這一種方案的話，那Fed的舉措或許可以算是合理。但他質疑是否也存在其他“中間”選擇，比如對摩根大通強硬一些；尋找另外的收購者；有選擇地剝離貝爾斯登投資組合中的某些資產；或是加快實施Fed新提出的以其投資組合中的美國國債暫時交換貝爾斯登流動性不足的資產。
萊因哈特說，上述措施都是可能的選擇，但卻沒有實行。
Fed 主席貝南克(Ben Bernanke)和紐約聯邦儲備銀行(New York Federal Reserve Bank)行長蒂莫西·蓋斯勒(Timothy Geithner)堅定地表示，他們3月中旬的舉措是防止貝爾斯登破產的唯一辦法，他們認為，貝爾斯登一旦破產將引發金融系統更大範圍的混亂和破壞。他們認為貝爾斯登的股東承受了高昂的代價，從而降低了其他公司效仿這一先例的風險。
另外一些討論會成員為Fed進行了辯護。美國企業研究院的另一名學者、對沖基金Caxton Associates的負責人約翰·馬金(John Makin)表示，重創貝爾斯登股東，同時保護與貝爾斯登有交易及借貸關係的其他方的舉措是合理的。
馬金說：“投行內的交易對手差不多相當於商業銀行的存款人。如果Fed坐視不理，貝爾斯登很可能破產，而一大批其他的投資銀行也可能破產。”
Former Fed official criticizes Bear Stearns rescue
-Vincent Reinhart calls the move the 'worst policy decision in a generation.'
Vincent Reinhart, a former top Federal Reserve aide, said Monday that the central bank's rescue of Bear Stearns Cos. was the "worst policy decision in a generation."
Fed officials invoked emergency powers last month to loan $13 billion to Bear Stearns after the fifth-largest U.S. securities firm said it was considering filing for bankruptcy.
"The panicked decision jumped over other possibilities" and may prove as damaging as Fed policy errors that caused the "great contraction" of the 1930s and the "great inflation" of the 1970s, said Reinhart, who was a senior policy advisor to former Fed Chairman Alan Greenspan and the current chairman, Ben S. Bernanke.
The Fed's Board of Governors invoked an emergency rule March 14 to loan the money to Bear Stearns after the firm informed New York Fed officials that it would have to file for bankruptcy. Two days later, the Fed agreed to finance $30 billion of illiquid Bear assets to secure its takeover by JPMorgan Chase & Co.
The Fed on March 16 also opened up lending to investment banks, another unusual extension of credit by the Fed to non-bank corporations.
The Fed's actions "eliminated forever the possibility that the Federal Reserve could serve as an 'honest broker,' " Reinhart said in a slide presentation. The central bank also "tilted the political playing field toward direct mortgage relief."
Reinhart spoke at a seminar at the American Enterprise Institute in Washington, where he is a resident scholar.
全球自由資本主義之死
記住這個日子：2008年3月14日星期五──這是全球自由市場資本主義夢想破滅的一天。30年來，我們一直在努力締造市場主導的金融體系。美聯儲 (Fed)——美國貨幣政策負責機構和自由市場資本主義的首席宣導者——決定拯救貝爾斯登(Bear Stearns)，宣告了這一時代的終結。它用行動表明，自己贊同德意志銀行(Deutsche Bank)首席執行官約瑟夫·阿克曼(Josef Ackermann)的說法：“我不再相信市場的自我修復能力”；政府解除管制已達極限。
我不是要評判美聯儲拯救貝爾斯登脫離破產境地是否正確。美聯儲不僅決定成為一家投資銀行的最後貸款人，還讓自身的賬目承擔了信用風險，我不知道市場風險是否決定了它只能這麼做。但相關官員都是嚴肅的人。他們做出決定必定是有理由的。他們肯定可以提到當前的風險——美聯儲前主席艾倫·格林斯潘(Alan Greenspan)稱之為“自二戰結束以來最嚴重的危機”——以及貝爾斯登在這些脆弱的市場中扮演的角色。
美聯儲作為“最後貸款人”
我主要是想評判一下美聯儲決定的意義。簡言之，人們認為貝爾斯登極具系統重要性，因此不能倒閉。沒錯，這一觀點是在危機時刻倉促形成的。但危機時刻正是新職能出現的時候，特別是19世紀央行作為“最後貸款人”的職能。
美聯儲決定的意義顯而易見：這些金融機構將不得不面臨力度大得多的監管。美聯儲為投行提供了一種寶貴的保險形式。實際上，從展開拯救以來股市的表現看，這點已經十分明顯：其他大型投行的股價取得了可觀漲幅（參見圖表）。這是可見的道德風險。美聯儲認定，貨幣市場對投行 “罷工”，相當於商業銀行的存款擠兌。它的結論是：由於這個原因，它必須打開有利於這類金融機構的貨幣“龍頭”。更大力度的監管勢在必行。
誠然，在這場危機結束後，華爾街的遊說者將反對資本金要求或流動性方面的繁重監管。他們或許會成功。但從理性上說，他們的立場如今站不住腳。具有系統重要性的金融機構必須為它們得到的政府保護付出代價。它們享受“上行風險”帶來的好處，而將“下行風險”轉嫁給整個社會，這種能力必須受到限制。這不僅是一個公平問題（儘管它也是），還是一個效率問題。一個不受監管卻接受補貼的賭場不會很好地配置資源。更有甚者，這種補貼目前不僅適用于股東，而且適用于所有債權人。其結果是導致資金成本低廉到不合理的程度。這些非常離譜的激勵措施必須得到解決。
美聯儲認為有必要採取這一措施，對此我深感遺憾。曾幾何時，我曾希望證券化可以將大部分風險負擔轉移到受監管的銀行體系之外，政府不再需要進行干預。事實證明，這是一種妄想。由同樣危險的融資促成的大量風險（就算不是赤裸裸的欺詐）貸款，已使證券化市場變得風險很高，給在這些市場上進行密集操作的金融機構（特別是貝爾斯登）造成了損害。
危機過後 強化監管
不過，這場危機肯定標誌著對金融自由化態度的轉捩點，而美聯儲將安全網延伸至投行並不是唯一原因。美國（或許其他幾個發達國家很快也會出現）住宅市場的混亂也是一樣。以低調著稱的美聯儲主席本·伯南克(Ben Bernanke)在一次內容令人毛骨悚然的講話中表示，近年發放的大多數次級抵押貸款“既不負責任，也不謹慎”。*這是美聯儲對“犯罪和瘋狂”的表述。同樣，這種情況也不能再發生了，特別是考慮到此類放貸行為對金融體系造成的損失可能非常巨大。住宅價格崩盤，違約率不斷上升，喪失抵押品贖回權的情況日益增多，將影響到成百上千萬的選民。政客不會無視他們的困境，即便結果是為這種輕率行為提供代價高昂的紓困。但後果肯定是較目前力度大得多的監管。
如果美國本身已越過了解除金融監管的“高水位”，這將產生廣泛的全球影響。直到不久以前，西方還可能告訴中國人、印度人或那些過去20年遭受過嚴重金融危機的人，世界上存在一個既自由又強勁的金融體系。形勢已不復從前。事實上，我們將很難說服這些國家相信，美國及其它高收入國家暴露的市場問題不是一次可怕的警告。他們會問，如果擁有豐富經驗和資源的美國都不能避開這些陷阱，那麼為什麼要期待我們做得更好？
對解除金融市場監管態度的長遠影響，遠非當前動盪意義如此重大的唯一原因。我們仍然不得不度過眼下的危機。金融利潤大幅下降（在美國經濟中非常明顯），住宅價格崩盤，大宗商品價格大幅上漲，這種組合可能引發一場漫長的深度經濟衰退。為了應對這種風險，美聯儲已將短期利率大幅調降至2.25%。與此同時，美聯儲顯然還面臨全球投資者逃離美元計價債務和通脹重新抬頭的風險。除了投資者希望持有美元計價證券最安全發行人——美國財政部的負債以外，很難找到長期美國國債收益率如此之低的原因。
“有人說世界將終結於熊熊烈焰，有人則說世界將終結於凜凜寒冰，”哈佛大學(Harvard)的肯尼斯·羅格夫(Kenneth Rogoff)最近引用羅伯特·弗羅斯特(Robert Frost)的話來描述我們面臨的金融毀滅（熊熊烈焰）和通脹（凜凜寒冰）風險。**這是危險的時代，也是具有歷史意義的時代。美國正展現出解除監管的極限。在不拋棄過去30年成果的情況下管理這種不可避免的轉變，是一項艱巨的挑戰。順利完成未來的解除杠杆頭寸也是如此。但我們必須從正確的地方開始，認識到即便是最近的過去也是一個陌生的國度。
*《造就可持續的住宅所有制》(Fostering Sustainable Homeownership)，2008年3月14日
** 《全球化與貨幣政策》(Globalization and Monetary Policy)，2008年3月7日，“全球化、通貨膨脹和貨幣政策會議”(conference on globalization, inflation and monetary Policy)
THE RESCUE OF BEAR STEARNS MARKS LIBERALISATION'S LIMIT
Remember Friday March 14 2008: it was the day the dream of global free- market capitalism died. For three decades we have moved towards market-driven financial systems. By its decision to rescue Bear Stearns, the Federal Reserve, the institution responsible for monetary policy in the US, chief protagonist of free-market capitalism, declared this era over. It showed in deeds its agreement with the remark by Josef Ackermann, chief executive of Deutsche Bank, that “I no longer believe in the market's self-healing power”. Deregulation has reached its limits.
Mine is not a judgment on whether the Fed was right to rescue Bear Stearns from bankruptcy. I do not know whether the risks justified the decisions not only to act as lender of last resort to an investment bank but to take credit risk on the Fed's books. But the officials involved are serious people. They must have had reasons for their decisions. They can surely point to the dangers of the times – a crisis that Alan Greenspan, former chairman of the Federal Reserve, calls “the most wrenching since the end of the second world war” – and the role of Bear Stearns in these fragile markets.
Mine is more a judgment on the implications of the Fed's decision. Put simply, Bear Stearns was deemed too systemically important to fail. This view was, it is true, reached in haste, at a time of crisis. But times of crisis are when new functions emerge, notably the practices associated with the lender-of-last-resort function of central banks, in the 19th century.
The implications of this decision are evident: there will have to be far greater regulation of such institutions. The Fed has provided a valuable form of insurance to the investment banks. Indeed, that is already evident from what has happened in the stock market since the rescue: the other big investment banks have enjoyed sizeable jumps in their share prices (see chart below). This is moral hazard made visible. The Fed decided that a money market “strike” against investment banks is the equivalent of a run on deposits in a commercial bank. It concluded that it must, for this reason, open the monetary spigots in favour of such institutions. Greater regulation must be on the way.
The lobbies of Wall Street will, it is true, resist onerous regulation of capital requirements or liquidity, after this crisis is over. They may succeed. But, intellectually, their position is now untenable. Systemically important institutions must pay for any official protection they receive. Their ability to enjoy the upside on the risks they run, while shifting parts of the downside on to society at large, must be restricted. This is not just a matter of simple justice (although it is that, too). It is also a matter of efficiency. An unregulated, but subsidised, casino will not allocate resources well. Moreover, that subsidisation does not now apply only to shareholders, but to all creditors. Its effect is to make the costs of funds unreasonably cheap. These grossly misaligned incentives must be tackled.
I greatly regret the fact that the Fed thought it necessary to take this step. Once upon a time, I had hoped that securitisation would shift a substantial part of the risk-bearing outside the regulated banking system, where governments would no longer need to intervene. That has proved a delusion. A vast amount of risky, if not downright fraudulent, lending, promoted by equally risky finance, has made securitised markets highly risky. This has damaged institutions, notably Bear Stearns, that operated intensively in these markets.
Yet the extension of the Fed's safety net to investment banks is not the only reason this crisis must mark a turning-point in attitudes to financial liberalisation. So, too, is the mess in the US (and perhaps quite soon several other developed countries') housing markets. Ben Bernanke, Fed chairman, famously understated, described much of the subprime mortgage lending of recent years as “neither responsible nor prudent” in a speech whose details make one's hair stand on end.* This is Fed-speak for “criminal and crazy”. Again, this must not happen again, particularly since the losses imposed on the financial system by such lending could yet prove enormous. The collapse in house prices, rising defaults and foreclosures will affect millions of voters. Politicians will not ignore their plight, even if the result is a costly bail-out of the imprudent. But the aftermath will surely be much more regulation than today's.
If the US itself has passed the high water mark of financial deregulation, this will have wide global implications. Until recently, it was possible to tell the Chinese, the Indians or those who suffered significant financial crises in the past two decades that there existed a financial system both free and robust. That is the case no longer. It will be hard, indeed, to persuade such countries that the market failures revealed in the US and other high-income countries are not a dire warning. If the US, with its vast experience and resources, was unable to avoid these traps, why, they will ask, should we expect to do better?
These longer-term implications for attitudes to deregulated financial markets are far from the only reason the present turmoil is so significant. We still have to get through the immediate crisis. A collapse in financial profits (so significant in the US economy), a house-price crash and a big rise in commodity prices are a combination likely to generate a long and deep recession. To tackle this danger the Fed has already slashed short-term rates to 2.25 per cent. Meanwhile, the Fed also clearly risks a global flight from dollar- denominated liabilities and a resurgence in inflation. It is hard to see a reason for yields on long-term Treasuries being so low, other than a desire to hold the liabilities of the US Treasury, safest issuer of dollar- denominated securities.
“Some say the world will end in fire, Some say in ice.” Harvard's Kenneth Rogoff recently quoted Robert Frost's words in describing the dangers of financial ruin (fire) and inflation (ice) confronting us.** These are perilous times. They are also historic times. The US is showing the limits of deregulation. Managing this unavoidable shift, without throwing away what has been gained in the past three decades, is a huge challenge. So is getting through the deleveraging ahead in anything like one piece. But we must start in the right place, by recognising that even the recent past is a foreign country.
*Fostering Sustainable Homeownership, March 14 2008, www.federalreserve.gov;
**Globalization and Monetary Policy, March 7 2008, conference on globalization, inflation and monetary Policy
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